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The Rise and Expressions 
of Consistency in EU Law: Legal 
and Strategic Implications 
for European Integration
ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL AND THEODORE KONSTADINIDES*
Abstract
The principle of consistency has a prominent place in EU law. In the Treaty of 
Lisbon, it constitutes an umbrella under which a number of legal principles of 
EU law follow as corollaries. Consistency manifests itself within both horizontal 
and vertical levels of governance. This chapter will unpack this principle and 
will focus on the broader implications of consistency for the division of powers 
in EU law. In doing so, the authors aim to discuss the rise of consistency in EU 
law and decrypt its various constitutional expressions in order to determine its 
scope of application. Two notions of consistency are presented: a formal one 
that appears in the Treaty of Lisbon and a strategic one, prominent in the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). It is argued that 
consistency is relevant to both traditional (integrationist) and alternative (dif-
ferentiated) routes to European integration. The chapter concludes by discuss-
ing whether the undefined nature of ‘consistency’ puts it at risk of becoming an 
empty vessel.
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS CHAPTER ANALYSES the rise and expressions of the principle of consistency in EU law by looking at its increasingly important role in contemporary EU law. In particular, the contribution looks at 
* Special thanks go to Gareth Davies and Luke Mason as well as to the anonymous reviewer 
for their helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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how the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) uses the notion of 
‘consistency’ as a legal tool for deciding on ‘hard’ cases. It aims to evaluate 
the constitutional impact of consistency in EU law by looking at how it drives 
uniform outcomes and attempts to ensure an institutional balance within 
the different speeds of EU integration. It is highlighted that the undefined 
scope of consistency hides the danger that it becomes an empty term which 
means all or nothing. 
The chapter is structured into three sections. Section II discusses briefly 
the place of consistency in EU law. It investigates the meaning of consis-
tency by analysing it in the light of its broader implications for the division 
of powers in EU law. It also looks at how the EU’s emphasis on consistency 
is reflected in the constitutional structure of the Treaty of Lisbon. We focus 
on the function of consistency as a means of promoting clearer compe-
tence delimitation and conflict prevention/resolution between the EU and 
the Member States’ legal orders. This notion is built on the premise that 
consistency forms a prerequisite of EU legislation and is synonymous with 
legal stability in the EU legal order. 
Section III focuses on the meaning of consistency as an integrative tool in 
the EU machinery. It investigates how the Treaty of Lisbon has reinforced 
the use of consistency (both horizontally and vertically) from mainly an 
external relations principle (found in the former Article 3 TEU) to a free-
standing formal legal imperative which governs the EU legal integration 
process. We critique, in particular, the CJEU’s reading of ‘strategic’ consis-
tency, which comes close to the classic effectiveness reasoning in EU law by 
resembling a ‘catch-all’ provision. We analyse such a coercive character of 
the notion of consistency in EU law by looking into cases where the CJEU 
is pushing Member States to achieve uniform results. Our analysis benefits 
from examples drawn from different policy areas. 
Section IV identifies the place of consistency with regard to the notion 
of differentiated integration. We look at the meaning of the principle of 
consistency in the context of differentiation and flexibility. In doing so, our 
aim is to demonstrate that consistency does not always mandate a holistic 
approach to integration, but helps to generate uniform outcomes within ad 
hoc initiatives or, to put it differently, sub-legal systems operating at differ-
ent speeds within the EU. To use an example, consistency manifests itself 
within the area of enhanced cooperation as a means of aligning diversity 
with the wider policies of the EU. However, differentiation also includes a 
number of modalities which do not expressly require consistency in order 
to operate. For instance, there is no reference to consistency in the relevant 
treaty provisions regulating the so-called ‘opt-outs’. This is despite the 
dangers that such ‘differentiation’ carries for European integration from 
the perspective of uniformity. The question is therefore whether or not 
consistency can be utilised effectively as a means of managing differentiated 
integration that varies across both EU policies and Member States. 
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Two notions of consistency in EU law are identified in the present chapter, 
namely: i) formal consistency; and ii) strategic/policy oriented consistency. 
While the notion of formal consistency is attributed to the treaty structure 
and its insistence on institutional balance, the concept of ‘strategic’ consis-
tency is linked to judicial interpretation, in particular, the CJEU’s eminent 
teleological, or purposeful, reasoning.1
II. THE MEANING OF CONSISTENCY IN EU LAW
Consistency ranks high in the EU legal chart as a constitutional principle 
which is relevant not only in the context of adjudication but also at the 
legislative and constitutional levels. This is evident from the numerous ref-
erences to consistency in the Treaty of Lisbon as a legal obligation assigned 
to EU institutions. Yet a number of language versions of the treaties refer 
to consistency as coherence.2 In the literal sense, though, consistency does 
not necessarily denote coherence and vice versa. In EU law, consistency is 
often defined as ‘the absence of contradictions, whereas coherence refers 
to positive connections’.3 While recognising that EU policies shall be both 
consistent and coherent, this chapter will refer to ‘consistency’, used in the 
English-language version of the Treaty of Lisbon, as an all-encompassing 
principle rather than a precondition to coherence.4 This is for the sake of 
clarity, as well as in order to avoid making a false allegation out of linguistic 
pedantry that the treaty drafters omitted to pay lip service to the principle 
of coherence by referring to consistency. 
The concern and desire for consistency is not a unique feature of the EU 
legal order—it is rather eminent in any study of law and has often appeared 
in debates concerning legal reasoning. In short, consistency implies that two 
rules are consistent when they produce the same result on the same facts or 
raise a similar legal issue. Moreover, the notion of consistency is concerned 
1  Teleological or purposive interpretation means in this context interpretation in accordance 
with the rationale of the provision or the policy aim underlying the rule. See M Hesselink, 
‘A Toolbox for European Judges’ (2011) 17 European Law Journal 441.
2  For an overview of the different language interpretations of consistency, see C Franklin, 
‘The Burgeoning Principle of Consistency in EU Law’ (2011) Yearbook of European Law 11. 
For academic references to coherence, see M Cremona, ‘Coherence in European Union Foreign 
Relations Law’ in P Koutrakos (ed), European Foreign Policy: Legal and Political Perspectives 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011) 59; S Prechal and B van Roermund, The Coherence of 
EU Law: The Search for Unity in Divergent Concepts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2008). See also D Leczykiewicz, ‘Why Do the European Court of Justice Judges Need Legal 
Concepts?’ (2008) 14 European Law Journal 773.
3  G De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 251. See also R Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European 
Community: Legal Reasoning and Legal Discourses (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2008) 415.
4  See, eg, M Derlén, Multilingual Interpretation of EU law (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009) 352. 
142 ESTER HERLIN-KARNELL AND THEODORE KONSTADINIDES
with the symmetry of all components of a given legal system. In this context, 
it might be useful to turn to Dworkin, who notably argued that the concept 
of coherence in law goes beyond ‘bare consistency’, ie, a mere agreement and 
compatibility between a set of rules.5 Coherence in this respect represents 
consistency and ‘a single vision of justice’6 or, in other words, ‘integrity’.7 
According to Dworkin, in a non-utopian political society, we value not only 
justice and fairness and procedural due process, but also distinct political 
values which are referred to as ‘integrity’.8 This view of consistency could be 
labelled as ‘strategic’ consistency. But it is not only Dworkin who discussed 
consistency in legal theory. The notion of consistency or coherence embodies 
MacCormick’s contention that the law should make sense if considered as a 
whole by being rational and orderly.9 It is about ensuring common sense by 
insisting on consistency. Hence, consistency as a systemic principle is embed-
ded in the constitutional text of a legal system as an element of the rule of 
law, helping to ensure legal certainty. As such, it constitutes a virtue by which 
a given legal system is to be judged. In EU law, however, consistency can 
be divided into vertical consistency based on clear competence delimitation 
and conflict prevention/resolution between the EU and the Member States’ 
legal orders, and horizontal consistency based on cooperation between the 
institutional actors involved in EU decision making.10 Consistency therefore 
finds expression within a web of legal obligations in EU law. It is reflected 
in the notions of loyalty and primacy (vertical consistency), as well as in 
the broader principles of good administration and good governance related 
to openness, transparency and accountability to democratic institutions 
(horizontal consistency).11 But still, this broad categorisation does not make 
consistency self-evident as a legal obligation. 
The principle of consistency can be found in a number of EU treaty 
provisions, which either set a general obligation for EU institutions to 
act consistently (in accordance with EU objectives and values) within the 
bounds of their competence or draw their attention into certain areas (eg, 
external relations) where consistency is a necessary guideline in order to 
  5 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press, 1978).
  6  S Guest, Ronald Dworkin (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1991) 39–40.
  7  Discussed in M Maduro, ‘Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism’ in M Avbelj and 
J Komarek (eds), Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2012). See also S Besson, ‘From European Integration to European Integrity: 
Should European Law Speak with Just One Voice?’ (2004) European Law Journal 257.
  8  For a discussion of Dworkin in the light of legal pluralism, see P Eleftheriadis, ‘Pluralism 
and Integrity’ (2010) 23(3) Ratio Juris 365, 377–78. 
  9  N MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, 
reprinted paperback edn 1995) xiv.
10  See, eg, M Cremona, ‘Coherence through Law: What Difference Will the Treaty of Lisbon 
Make?’ (2008) 3(1) Hamburg Review of Social Sciences 17.
11  See, eg, European Commission, ‘European Governance (White Paper)’ COM(2001) 428 
final.
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achieve a coherent legislative result. This form of consistency has a central 
place in the enactment of integrative and unifying legislation by the EU 
legislative institutions. Yet, consistency is not always utilised as a means of 
furthering integration. As discussed later in this chapter, it may also apply 
in areas not strictly characterised by integration. A study of the treaty’s 
provisions on flexibility and enhanced cooperation in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice (ASFJ) and the EU’s external action reveals that consis-
tency manifests itself differently when Member States decide to proceed at 
different speeds of integration. 
Finally, the notion of consistency finds meaning in judicial interpretation 
and reasoning. Lack of consistency therefore results in legal uncertainty, 
which in the context of CJEU case law would have an adverse effect on, for 
example, the rights of EU citizens.12 Of course, EU law is not merely about 
setting a number of objectives inherent in the treaties but is also about judi-
cial arguments as to what these objectives should entail. Unavoidably, the 
CJEU is commonly confronted with ‘hard cases’. The well-known Viking13 
judgment offers an illuminating account of how the CJEU sets out to tackle 
such hard cases. As it is eminent, in Viking, the CJEU was called upon to 
balance the right to free movement of workers against social protection 
advocated by labour unions. The CJEU favoured its classic market template 
in a horizontal situation of trade unions against the individual building 
companies and workers. It was a ‘hard case’ because, on the one hand, the 
CJEU had to ensure that free movement was complied with and make sure 
that national protectionism was avoided at all costs. On the other hand, 
there were sensitive labour law and social protection issues at stake.14 The 
CJEU chose to uphold free movement law. It can be argued that most of 
the early cases in European integration (where the CJEU had to establish 
the autonomous legal nature of the EU legal system) were all hard cases. 
Moreover, the notions of effectiveness and uniformity formed part of 
the broader constitutional understanding of the principle of consistency in 
EU law. 
Thus, consistency has over time become an anchoring point for extend-
ing EU law competences. However, value-based consistency should be 
distinguished from the distinct notion of purposeful or teleological consis-
tency employed by the CJEU. In the CJEU’s case law, consistency appears 
closely linked to the uniform application of EU law in the Member States 
by broadening the scope of EU (implied) powers. This pragmatic version 
12  Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and UK v 
Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Advocate General Opinion Bot, 19 March 2013, unreported. AG Bot 
opined that the principle of judicial review laid down by the CJEU in Kadi I requires further 
clarification.
13  Case C-438/05 Viking [2007] ECR I-10779. 
14  For a recent analysis, see A Somek, Engineering Equality (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2011).
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of consistency is closely linked to effet utile reasoning which compromises 
national competence in the name of further integration. Effet utile, in this 
context, comprises ‘one big legal cluster’,15 which encompasses several 
judge-made legal duties and fundamental constitutional principles of EU 
law (eg, loyalty and primacy), as well as abstract implicit commitments 
(eg, uniformity and continuity). 
III. CONSISTENCY AS AN INTEGRATIVE TOOL IN EU LAW 
A. Consistency in the Treaty of Lisbon 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides a number of provisions that refer to 
‘consistency’ as a main objective or as a path to achieve legal certainty 
and coherence. This section will provide an overview of these provisions 
to understand how consistency manifests itself in the Treaty of Lisbon as 
a formal or black-letter notion. For reasons of economy, while this sec-
tion will provide a comprehensive outline, it will not delve into a thorough 
examination of the implications of each and every primary or secondary law 
provision which refers to consistency. We will, however, locate all primary 
law provisions which make explicit reference to different formulations of 
consistency. Moreover, we will use the examples of consumer protection, 
data protection and EU external action, to name but a few areas, to illustrate 
how consistency provides justification for the adoption of EU secondary 
legislation. We therefore acknowledge that further research is necessary to 
determine how consistency is applied in every single EU policy area.
The first reference to consistency in the Treaty of Lisbon is found in 
Article 7 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), 
which stipulates that the EU ‘shall ensure consistency between its policies 
and activities, taking all of its objectives into account and in accordance 
with the principle of conferral of powers’. The principle of conferral inher-
ent in Article 5(1) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) stresses that EU 
acts must have a specific legal basis (lex specialis) in the TFEU, corresponding 
to the field in which the EU institutions have decided to legislate. As the EU 
only derives its powers and authority from powers granted in the Treaty 
of Lisbon, it does not possess a genuine competence to unilaterally expand 
its powers. This is the crucial distinction between the EU and any sover-
eign state. According to a commentator, ‘some application of lex specialis 
seems inevitable to produce a high degree of consistency, coherence, and 
15  See, eg, E Herlin-Karnell, The Constitutional Dimension of European Criminal Law, 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012) ch 4.
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predictability’.16 It follows that consistency in EU law is achieved when the 
EU is acting intra vires and the EU judiciary is rigidly applying lex specialis 
as a formal interpretation rule. Article 7 TFEU therefore aims at tackling 
complexity and legitimacy gaps, the permanent features of multi-level 
governance. 
In the same vein, Article 13(1) TEU provides that the EU institutional 
framework ‘shall aim to promote its values, advance its objectives, serve its 
interests, those of its citizens and those of the Member States, and ensure 
the consistency, effectiveness and continuity of its policies and actions’. 
A glance at Articles 7 and 13 TFEU therefore suggests that not only is 
consistency important as a way of ensuring that the EU is acting intra vires, 
but that it also forms a significant aid in the drafting and negotiation of 
EU legislative proposals. An example of the use of this kind of formal con-
sistency, or at least attempted use, is in the field of consumer protection, 
where Directive 2011/83 on consumer rights was proposed in order to 
establish a higher level of ‘consistency’ between existing legislation merging 
four directives into one set of rules.17 There is a risk, however, behind such 
a tidying-up exercise, because coherent EU law may result in incoherent 
national law. As such, the Directive has been criticised for failing to achieve 
its ambition in its quest for consistency.18 Consistency as a legislative aspi-
ration is therefore in danger of becoming a buzzword, as it is not enough 
that a new piece of secondary law appears to have achieved a coherent 
legislative result. Much also depends on how secondary legislation is imple-
mented in national law and consistency in transposition has not yet been 
achieved in consumer law. 
On a different note, consistency is also frequently highlighted in the 
Stockholm Programme19 (which sets out the AFSJ agenda to be achieved 
during 2009–14) and the need to ensure the consistency of EU policies for 
the development of a successful AFSJ. In this context, consistency is linked 
to the orderly (EU) constitutionalisation of new areas. Moreover, the recent 
proposal for a directive on the processing of personal data by competent 
authorities for the purpose of the prevention of crime frequently stresses the 
16  G Conway, ‘Conflicts of Competence Norms in EU Law and the Legal Reasoning of the 
ECJ’ (2010) 11(9) German Law Journal 966.
17  Directive 2011/83/EU of 25 October 2011 on consumer rights, amending Council 
Directive 93/13/EEC and Directive 1999/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council, and repealing Council Directive 85/577/EEC and Directive 97/7/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council [2011] OJ L304/64. For a critique, see A Arnull, ‘The Principle 
of Effective Judicial Protection in EU Law: An Unruly Horse?’ (2011) 36(1) European Law 
Review 51, 65.
18  See, eg, S Weatherill, ‘The Consumer Rights Directive: How and Why a Quest for 
“Coherence” Has (Largely) Failed’ (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 1279.
19  The Stockholm Programme—An Open and Secure Europe Serving and Protecting the 
Citizen [2009] OJ C115/1.
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importance of ensuring consistency for the protection of personal data.20 In 
this sense, consistency forms a point of reference for future legislation under 
Title V of the TFEU. As explained above, this form of bare consistency pro-
motes integrative and unifying legislation by the EU legislative institutions. 
Hence, when it comes to legal drafting, consistency can be interpreted not 
only as consistency of content (ie, coordination and avoidance of contradic-
tion) but also as consistency of logic (consolidation) and goals. Consistency 
then seems to form part the raison d’etre for justifying EU activity in the first 
place. Equally, consistency is key in the adoption of ‘smart’ EU regulation 
vis-a-vis enterprise and industry.21
As already stressed, apart from the importance of consistency as a value 
in shaping legal drafting, consistency plays theoretically an important part 
in judicial decision making.22 To that end, Article 256 TFEU provides that 
where the General Court considers that a case before it requires a decision of 
principle that is likely to affect the unity or consistency of EU law, it may 
refer the case to the CJEU for a ruling. Equally, where there is a serious 
threat to the unity or consistency of EU law, the General Court’s preliminary 
rulings may exceptionally be subject to review by the CJEU. For instance, 
the CJEU has to ensure consistency between the rights under the EU Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR).23 It needs to be stressed, however, that a review of the General 
Court’s preliminary rulings constitutes a theoretical possibility since the 
CJEU is still the only EU court which hears preliminary references. On a dif-
ferent note, consistency may also prove important in the interaction between 
the CJEU and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) following the 
forthcoming accession of the EU to the ECHR.24 There, consistency may 
justify a purposeful interpretation of the Treaty of Lisbon in order to pre-
serve the integrity of the EU legal system against external influences.
20  See, eg, European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Directive on the protection of individu-
als with regard to the processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purpose 
of prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of 
criminal penalties, and the free movement of such data’ COM(2012) 10 final.
21  European Commission, ‘Smart Regulation in the European Union (Communication)’ 
COM(2010) 0543 final.
22  B Levenbook, ‘The Role of Coherence in Legal Reasoning’ (1984) 3 Law and Philosophy 
355.
23  See especially Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2000] OJ C364/01, 
art 52(3): ‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning 
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This 
provision shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’
24  On the EU’s accession to the ECHR, see, eg, N O’Meara, ‘“A More Secure Europe of 
Rights?” The European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
and EU Accession to the ECHR’ (2011) 12 German Law Journal 1813; K Dzehtsiarou, 
T Konstadinides, T Lock and N O’Meara, Human Rights Law in Europe: The influence, over-
laps and contradictions of the EU and the ECHR (London, Routledge, forthcoming).
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With regard to the EU’s external action, Article 18(4) TEU charges the 
newly appointed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and 
Security Policy with the duty to ensure the consistency of the EU’s external 
action. Article 21(3) TEU further adds that the Council, the Commission 
and the High Representative are entrusted with the duty to ensure consis-
tency in EU external action. Similarly, in the area of common foreign and 
security policy (CFSP), Article 26(2) TEU states that the Council and the 
High Representative shall ensure the unity, consistency and effectiveness of 
EU action. As Eeckhout explains, the fact that consistency is such a high-
level concern in the context of EU external action ‘is no doubt related to the 
[former] pillar structure itself and the tension between intergovernmentalism 
and supranationalism, particularly at [the] institutional level’.25 While 
decision making within the TEU (CFSP provisions) is a matter of unanimity 
in the Council, external action under Part V of the TFEU provides the 
Commission and the Parliament with a more prominent role in the adop-
tion of measures in the area of common commercial policy, development 
cooperation and humanitarian aid, to mention but a few. What is more, 
consistency appears in the Treaty of Lisbon as an exporting principle within 
the specific context of civil protection. Article 196(1)(c) TFEU provides that 
the EU shall ‘promote consistency in international civil-protection work’ 
for the prevention and protection against natural or man-made disasters. 
So the EU appears to be not only an advocate but also, and perhaps more 
significantly, a promoter of consistency.26
Having briefly considered the legal geography and structural aspects of 
consistency in the Treaty of Lisbon, it can be argued that the principle of 
consistency constitutes a condition for the enhancement of the unity of the 
EU legal order at both the horizontal and vertical levels of EU governance. 
Apart from Article 7 TFEU, which can be seen as a programmatic principle, 
all of the above-mentioned provisions provide a list of legal assignments 
for the EU institutions within specific policy areas. In that sense, consis-
tency within the Treaty of Lisbon is a driving incentive for EU institutions 
and a rationale for mainstreaming numerous policy areas. The Treaty is, 
however, neither explicit about the degree of cooperation demanded by 
Member States to achieve consistency nor transparent about the permissible 
degree of federal pre-emption allowed against inconsistent national rules. 
For instance, the search for consistency in various external affairs presents 
a very different problem from that which applies in separate internal EU 
25  P Eeckhout, External Relations of the EU (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011), 
187. Eeckhout also stresses that ‘the constitutional emphasis on consistency is something of a 
subterfuge, an attempt to cover up inter-institutional strife, to throw a constitutional blanket 
on the struggles between the Council and the Commission, not to mention the Parliament’.
26  See, eg, Press Release, ‘Cooperation in Disaster Management: The European Union and 
the United States Take a Major Step Forward’, IP/11/1365.
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policies. The CJEU has attempted to shed light on this issue through the 
establishment of a notion of ‘strategic’ (sometimes even teleological) con-
sistency examined below. 
B. Consistency and the Court of Justice 
The above analysis shows that the Treaty of Lisbon provides that formal 
consistency constitutes the main method of retaining predictability in EU 
law. A study of consistency in EU law, however, should also include an 
examination of the use of the principle by CJEU judges. This is because 
EU law includes both treaty objectives and judicial arguments as to what 
these objectives should entail. It will be seen that the CJEU has developed a 
notion of consistency, which could be broadly characterised as political or, 
as the present authors would like to refer to it, ‘strategic’ consistency. This 
notion also features a teleological version of consistency that is prominent 
in the CJEU’s far-reaching jurisprudence as part of its arsenal which helps to 
bring about uniformity and effectiveness in the application of EU law. 
‘Strategic’ consistency constitutes a judicial tool to resolve ‘hard cases’ 
through a balancing exercise of national and collective EU interests. So, 
as noted, in Viking and Laval,27 for instance, the CJEU recognised for 
the first time that the right to take collective action, including the right 
to strike, forms an integral part of EU law, the observance of which the 
CJEU shall always ensure. The CJEU imposed limitations upon the right to 
strike by ensuring that it cannot be exercised in practice without the risk 
of legal liability. The CJEU could not alter its inclusive market mentality 
at the expense of national protectionism by establishing that the right to 
strike comprises an indispensable component of the Member States, which 
would take precedence over the EU fundamental freedoms. The political 
implications of these decisions are still topical in light of the ‘frozen’ ‘Prodi 
II’ Regulation, which attempted to affirm in legislative form the restrictions 
on the right to strike formulated judicially by the CJEU.28 
In addition, consistency can form a deciding motif to coordinate the uniform 
application of EU law in the Member States. Such a ‘teleological’ version of 
‘strategic’ consistency involves numerous obligations of outcomes. It is, 
however, problematic because it does not necessarily entail a consistent 
27  Viking (n 13); Case C-341/05 Laval [2007] ECR I-11767.
28  European Commission, ‘Proposal for a Council Regulation on the exercise of the right 
to take collective action within the context of the freedom of establishment and the freedom 
to provide services’ COM (2012) 130 final. The proposal was halted by national parlia-
ments, which utilised the so-called ‘yellow card’ procedure. Article 12 TEU and Protocol 2 of 
the Lisbon Treaty provide that a third of national chambers can raise such an objection on 
the basis of the violation of the principle of subsidiarity. Therefore, the Proposal must now 
be reviewed by the Commission.
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strategy on the part of the EU. To achieve uniform outcomes, the CJEU has 
relied on classic EU constitutional principles which have over time helped to 
transform Europe into a political project.29 Central to the Europeanisation 
of national law is the principle of loyalty inherent in Article 4(3) TEU. 
Indeed, loyalty constitutes one of the strongest and most forceful principles 
to be found in the Treaty of Lisbon.30 According to this principle, the 
Member States shall facilitate the achievement of the EU’s tasks and refrain 
from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of its objectives. 
Hence, the loyalty obligation in EU law seeks to ensure consistency between 
national law and EU law, in that the latter takes precedence in the event of 
mutual conflict.31 
Moreover, consistency is often framed as synonymous to the ‘loyalty’ 
principle (Article 4(3) TEU) and functions both as a maxim of mutual coop-
eration and synergy and a corrective principle operating where Member 
States choose to act ‘disloyally’—ie, incompatibly with EU law. As such, 
loyalty has provided a justification for a number of expansive readings of 
EU law by the CJEU.32 In the absence of a clear legal basis in the Treaty 
pre-Lisbon, loyalty and the EU effectiveness axiom formed the rationale for 
the endorsement of the principle of primacy and the establishment of state 
liability.33 The above developments have undeniably encouraged uniform 
outcomes and have strengthened EU integration. Yet, the outcomes pushed 
through by the CJEU tell us little about whether loyalty is reconcilable 
with consistency and whether the degree of integration as achieved in the 
CJEU’s case law is compatible with the principle of subsidiarity or national 
identity (Articles 4(2) and 5 TEU). Hence, the notion of loyalty needs to 
be assessed against certain variables—namely, a balance has to be struck 
between consistency and subsidiarity in the broad sense. 
An example serves to clarify the point: in answering the question of 
whether Member States can impose territorial conditions on aid for 
audiovisual projects, the Commission has explained to Member States 
that such criteria undermine the consistency of the fundamental freedoms 
29  See, eg, JHH Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’ (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal 2403.
30  See, eg, JT Lang, ‘The Duties of Cooperation of National Authorities and Courts under 
Article 10 EC’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 84.
31  See, eg, E Neframi, ‘The Duty of Loyalty: Rethinking its Scope through its Application 
in the Field of EU External Relations’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 323.
32  See, eg, JT Lang, ‘The Developments of the Court of Justice on the Duties of Cooperation 
of National Authorities and Community Institutions under Article 10 EC’ (2008) 31 Fordham 
International Law Journal 1483.
33  See, eg, P Craig, EU Administrative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 22. 
While most of this section is devoted to the principle of loyalty, the authors acknowledge that 
there are other areas of CJEU case law like national remedies, state liability or direct effect 
of directives that further offer a fertile ground for the exploration of the kind of teleological 
consistency discussed here.
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underpinning the internal market.34 What is more, the CJEU has stressed 
that any tax exemption granted to producers and workers of cooperative 
societies established in the Member States needs to take place in compliance 
with the principles of consistency and proportionality.35 In other words, 
Member States need to apply the old discrimination test. This is easy to 
do and the CJEU’s jurisprudence is full of tips on how to achieve the best 
results. There are instances, however, where it can be argued that consis-
tency is in short supply. In the field of competition law, for example, legal 
uncertainty may spring out of the implementation difficulties of Article 101 
TFEU. This is allegedly because of the diverse traditions of the Member 
States and the ambivalent decentralised enforcement regime created by 
Regulation 1/200336 on the implementation of the rules on competition 
laid down in the EU Treaty.37 Inter alia, the Regulation has been criticised 
for being vague and for putting legal certainty in peril because it provides 
that the Commission shall share its enforcement powers with National 
Competition Authorities and national courts.38 On the other hand, however, 
a more convincing argument can be made against the old system of 
Commission exclusivity over the enforcement of Article 101(3) TFEU, 
which was ‘abnormal’ considering that most of EU law is enforced by both 
the EU and the national bodies, ‘with a corresponding risk of diversity 
in practice’.39 As such, Regulation 1/2003 has brought competition law 
enforcement back to the ‘communautaire mainstream’ at the expense of 
consistency/uniformity.40
In all cases, the CJEU has been explicit that a Member State may not rely 
on the provisions and practices of its domestic legal order in order to justify 
non-compliance with its obligations under EU law.41 This is particularly 
important since the removal of the Pillar structure implies that the principle 
of loyalty between the EU and the Member States (Article 4(3) TEU) and 
between the EU institutions (Article 13(2) TEU) applies to all areas of EU 
activity. As is well known, not only does the principle of loyalty encom-
pass a unified modus operandi for mainstreaming EU policies but, most 
34  J Blair, ‘State Aid for Films and Other Audiovisual Works’ (2011) 22(8) Entertainment 
Law Review 229, 231.
35  ‘ECJ Advises on Whether Tax System Entails Aid’ (2011) 288 EU Focus 24.
36  Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the 
rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1, 1–25.
37  C Townley, ‘Which Goals Count in Article 101 TFEU? Public Policy and its Discontents: 
The OFT’s Roundtable Discussion on Article 101(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union’ (2011) 32(9) European Competition Law Review 441, 446.
38  L Sevon, ‘Application of EC Competition Rules. Preliminary Observations on Council 
Regulation 1/2003’ in DAO Edward et al (eds), A True European: Essays for Judge David 
Edward (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2003) 146.
39  S Weatherill, Cases and Materials on EU Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007) 565.
40  Ibid.
41  See also Case C-46/08 Carmen Media Group Ltd [2010] ECR I-0000.
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significantly, it has provided the CJEU with a constitutional blanket for 
the expansion of EU law. In the context of EU external relations, Member 
States are under an obligation to refrain from an international obligation 
that may potentially jeopardise the full effectiveness of EU law. Ever since 
the CJEU’s ERTA dicta,42 the principle of loyalty has become a necessary 
component of the external dimension of EU law and the development of 
EU implied competences.43 The CJEU has found in the principle of loy-
alty an ‘obligation of providing result’. In the judgment of Commission v 
Sweden,44 the CJEU held that where the subject matter of a convention 
falls partly within the competence of the EU and partly within that of the 
Member States, it is imperative to ensure close cooperation between the 
Member States and the EU institutions. Such cooperation should take place 
both in the process of negotiation and conclusion, and in the fulfilment of 
the commitments entered into. 
Therefore, loyalty has a ‘pre-emptive’ effect upon the behaviour of 
Member States in that it pre-empts them from undertaking any action that 
could potentially undermine the objectives of the treaties. For this reason, 
it seems clear that the duty of loyalty can lead to a duty of abstention even 
if the competence at issue is neither a priori exclusive nor pre-emptive 
through the application of ERTA.45 Such a use of a ‘best endeavours obliga-
tion’ or an ‘obligation of result’ to discard any inconsistencies in the EU’s 
external relations approach seems to blur the procedural duties of Member 
States under the principle of loyalty as an obligation of conduct.46 The 
Commission v Sweden judgment illustrates that the obligation to cooperate 
derives from the requirement of uniformity in the international representa-
tion of the EU. By contrast, it can be argued that Commission v Sweden 
constitutes an one-off decision—ie, although the CJEU was extremely 
proactive in imposing a best endeavours obligation, it made it clear that this 
was confined to the specific legal context set out by the exceptional treaty 
provisions in question. In the same vein, it can be stressed that the overview 
of one case is not sufficient to substantiate broader conclusions about the 
42  Case 22/70 Commission v Council [1971] ECR 263.
43  Lang (n 30). See also Neframi (n 31); R Schütze, EU Constitutional Law (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) ch 10.
44  Case C-246/07 Commission v Sweden (PFOS) [2010] OJ C161/3. The CJEU held that, 
by unilaterally proposing that a chemical substance (perfluoroctane sulfonate: PFOS) be listed 
in Annex A to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (2001), Sweden 
failed to fulfil its obligations under art 4(3) TEU. See also Case C-459/03 Commission v 
Ireland (Mox Plant) [2006] ECR I-4635.
45  G De Baere, ‘O, Where is Faith? O, Where is Loyalty? Some Thoughts on the Duty of 
Loyal Co-operation and the Union’s External Environmental Competences in the Light of the 
PFOS Case’ (2011) 36(3) European Law Review 405, 417.
46  See, eg, C Hillion, ‘Tous pour un, Un pour tous! Coherence in the External Relations 
of the European Union’ in M Cremona (ed), Developments in EU External Relations Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) 10–36.
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CJEU vis-a-vis the imposition of a general best endeavours obligation upon 
the Member States. The authors share these views, but cannot overlook the 
‘strategic’ consistency motive behind Commission v Sweden, especially in 
view of the fact that Sweden was pre-empted from exercising a competence 
in compliance with EU law. In this case consistency functioned as a con-
straint that required Member States not to take unilateral actions. 
The principle of consistency has further adverse implications for hetero-
geneity in EU law if contextualised alongside the principle of primacy of 
EU law over national constitutions and over the international legal order.47 
The argument is as follows. Since the question of consistency as uniformity 
mostly arises in cases where Member States pursue conflicting aims to the 
spirit of the treaties, the CJEU has employed certain constitutional principles 
that can effectively restrain national action. Loyalty, on the one hand, as 
a duty of abstention, has the capacity of pre-empting national competence 
a priori. As seen in Commission v Sweden, the CJEU found in loyalty a 
best endeavours obligation imposed upon Member States to discard any 
discrepancies arising from national action capable of distorting the EU’s 
external policy philosophy. Primacy, on the other hand, as a purpose-over-
text principle appears to reinstate consistency a posteriori by precluding the 
application of inconsistent national measures over conflicting EU legisla-
tion. For instance, the interpretation of the Treaty of Lisbon’s fundamental 
freedoms by the CJEU provides a good example of where the CJEU has 
proposed that Member States shall modify their national legislation in order 
to ensure consistency. In this context, consistency implies the disapplication 
of domestic measures that pose obstacles to free movement.48 
Clearly, the CJEU has been highly successful in using teleological ‘strategic’ 
consistency as a method of achieving uniformity across the Member States. 
Yet, it could be argued that the CJEU’s recent approach to consistency in 
cases such as Commission v Sweden is not value-driven, nor does it forge a 
constitutional interpretative tool in the Dworkinian sense of consistency as 
integrity. It is instead tilting towards a ‘constitutional diktat’ based on the 
methodical application of coercive constitutional principles to justify EU 
competence and ensure the maximum effectiveness of EU law.49 Therefore, 
the notion of loyalty in the present context could be seen as an expres-
sion of ‘teleological’ consistency. It is thus argued that the CJEU’s notion 
of consistency may sometimes rely on an abstract reasoning which itself 
lacks consistency of strategy. In conclusion, the CJEU’s interpretation of 
47  See, eg, G de Búrca, ‘The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order 
after Kadi’ (2009) 51 Harvard Journal of International Law 1. 
48  See, eg, G Mathisen, ‘Consistency and Coherence as Conditions for Justification of 
Member State Measures Restricting Free Movement’ (2010) 47 CML Rev 1021.
49  See JHH Weiler, The Constitution of Europe: ‘Do the New Clothes Have an Emperor?’ 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) 322. 
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consistency requires adherence to a line of judgment and a certain mode 
of conduct which is historically crafted by definition and which is not 
attached to a clear political goal. In this context, the implications of con-
sistency may have a grave impact on the EU’s widely perceived democratic 
deficit, as there is little space for debate and change given the overriding 
requirement of consistency in terms of what could loosely be referred to as 
‘uniformity’.
IV. CONSISTENCY AND DIFFERENTIATED INTEGRATION 
Having discussed the formal and strategic notions of consistency in EU law 
as holistic approaches to uniform outcomes (furthering integration), this 
section of the chapter will look into consistency as a means of generating 
uniform outcomes within ad hoc initiatives or sub-legal systems operating 
at different speeds within the EU. More specifically, we will look into the 
concept of flexibility as a cooperation method that does not produce uni-
form results for all Member States. We will further explore various forms 
of differentiation in EU law in order to demonstrate, first, that consistency 
is not explicit in all variants of differentiated integration within the EU 
and, secondly, that even when it is expressly manifest, such as in the area 
of enhanced cooperation (Article 334 TFEU), ensuring consistency might 
prove difficult to utilise in initiatives that promote several tiers of integra-
tion. With this in mind, we will discuss whether consistency is apt as a legal 
principle employed by the CJEU to ‘discipline’ the scope and modalities of 
differentiated integration. In other words, we will discuss the effectiveness 
of consistency as both a procedural notion (ensuring the consistency of flex-
ibility initiatives vis-a-vis other EU policies) and one of outcomes (managing 
the degree of integration allowed by the variety of forms of multi-speed 
cooperation in the Treaty of Lisbon).
Flexibility as a legal concept, albeit with political connotations, is by no 
means new in EU law.50 Weatherill has defined it as ‘a many headed beast’ 
which ‘loosely … involves the development of collaborative inter-state 
endeavour which does not necessarily operate within the orthodox [EU] 
method nor does it imply the participation of all the Member States’.51 
In other words, flexibility provides a platform for the EU institutions 
to conceive of and implement methods of differentiated integration.52 
50  G Gaja, ‘How Flexible is Flexibility under the Amsterdam Treaty?’ (1998) CML Rev 1. 
51  S Weatherill, ‘If I’d Wanted You to Understand I Would Have Explained it Better: 
What is the Purpose of the Provisions on Closer Co-operation Introduced by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam?’ in D O’Keeffe and P Twomey (eds), Legal Issues of the Amsterdam Treaty 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1999) 21–40.
52  See, eg, E Vos, ‘Differentiation, Harmonization and Governance’ in B De Witte et al (eds), 
The Many Faces of Differentiation (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2001) 145. 
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Whether a la carte, two-tier or multi-speed, differentiated integration finds 
expression in overlapping conceptual schemes.53 Moreover, Van Gerven 
distinguishes between two main causes of differentiation: ‘[i] it is either the 
result of derogations granted to one or more Member States [eg, transi-
tional arrangements granted to Member States to facilitate their accession 
to the Union], or [ii] it is the result of enhanced cooperation between two or 
more Member States’.54 We may add a third category here: the differentiat-
ing effect of partial agreements which offer an alternative to an intra-EU 
closer cooperation framework (eg, the Schengen Convention or the possi-
bility for structured cooperation under the Common Security and Defence 
Policy).55 Flexibility in EU law is often described as a process of ‘deepening 
and widening’ the EU project, a term which, however appealing at first, is 
rather vague when it comes to its practical application.56 But one has to 
note that flexibility is a wide-ranging objective and represents a procedural 
notion rather than one of outcomes.57 
The Treaty of Lisbon provides for several forms of flexibility and differ-
entiation, including the ‘emergency brake’ provisions under Articles 48(2), 
82(3) and 83(3), and enhanced cooperation under Article 20 TEU and 
Articles 326–34 TFEU.58 These provisions aside, the history of the EU is full 
of examples of mini ‘opt-outs’ ranging from the Swedish strict approach to 
alcohol, or safeguarding of the snus oral tobacco, to more serious abstention 
of Member States from the Eurozone or the Schengen acquis.59 One could 
further argue that the treaty-based exceptions to free movement on the 
53  See, eg, A Stubb, ‘A Categorization of Differentiated Integration’ (1996) 34 Journal of 
Common Market Studies 283; D Curtin, ‘The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe 
of Bits and Pieces’ (1993) 30 Common Market Law Review 17; B De Witte, ‘Old-Fashioned 
Flexibility: International Agreements between Member States of the European Union’ in 
G de Búrca and J Scott (eds), Constitutional Change in the EU, From Uniformity to Flexibility? 
(Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) 31.
54  W Van Gerven, The European Union: A Polity of States and Peoples (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press, 2005) 29.
55  See, eg, T Dyson and T Konstadinides, European Defence Cooperation in EU Law and 
International Relations Theory (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 70–75.
56  A Faber, ‘Theoretical Approaches to EU Deepening and Widening: A Multi-disciplinary 
Overview and Some Tentative (Hypo)theses’ (EU-CONSENT Project Publications, 
2006). Available at: www.eu-consent.net/library/brx061012/WP%20II%20III%20
Paperredefiningconcepts.pdf. See also J Shaw, ‘Flexibility in a Reorganized and Simplified 
Treaty’ (2003) 40 CML Rev 279. 
57  J Shaw, ‘Relating Constitutionalism and Flexibility in the European Union’ in de Búrca 
and Scott (n 53) 353.
58  Other forms of differentiated integration include the CSDP-oriented structured coopera-
tion, found in arts 42(6) and 46 TEU (and Protocol 10), which gives the opportunity to a 
group of Member States entrusted under art 44 TEU to unilaterally implement the so-called 
Petersberg tasks concerning humanitarian and rescue assignments, peacekeeping and combat 
tasks in crisis management.
59  See generally A Rosas and L Armati, EU Constitutional Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 
2010) ch 7; JC Piris, The Future of Europe, Towards a Two-Speed Europe (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) ch 1.
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grounds of public policy, public health and public security (eg, Articles 36 
and 52 TFEU) also constitute a means of differentiation. In the same 
manner, the CJEU-established ‘mandatory requirements’ can be further 
understood within the context of differentiation vis-a-vis the permissible 
limits of Member States’ derogations under EU law on the free movement 
of goods. Moreover, there are examples of differentiation in the context 
of different levels of harmonisation under the internal market clause of 
Article 114(4)–(5) TFEU. This flexibility provision provides for derogations 
relating to the protection of the environment and risk regulation. 
With the above in mind, the notion of consistency can be utilised as a tool 
in managing the outcomes of differentiated integration. If consistency is per-
ceived as a one-size-fits-all principle, then the question is whether it is weak-
ened by the variety of forms of differentiation in which not all Member States 
participate. At face value, it appears impossible to reconcile consistency 
with differentiation because the latter appears adverse to the traditional 
view of consistency as symmetry of the components of a given legal system. 
Constitutional asymmetry, however, is a long-standing feature of European 
integration. It can be argued, for instance, that differentiation simply reflects 
a touchstone of subsidiarity—an abstention from the integrationist one-
size-fits-all template provided by the Treaty of Lisbon for most situations.60 
Hence, although at first glance certain features of consistency as a legal prin-
ciple may be undermined by differentiation, the principle may be capable of 
transfusing the classic integrative values upon which the EU is built to newly 
established sub-systems, such as those created under the enhanced coopera-
tion procedure, discussed below.61 There, consistency forms a requirement 
inherent in the Treaty of Lisbon mandating a certain pattern of behaviour 
vis-a-vis the conduct of EU institutions and the consistency of their activities 
with the wider policies of the EU. We will hereinafter discuss how consis-
tency manifests itself expressly and impliedly in differentiated integration.
A. Express Consistency in the Treaty of Lisbon: Enhanced Cooperation 
The desire for consistency accompanies the several forms of ‘flexibility’ 
under the treaties as sub-legal systems designed to promote individualisation. 
For instance, consistency is prominent in Title III TFEU, which contains in 
Articles 326–34 TFEU provisions on enhanced cooperation. In particular, 
Article 334 TFEU provides that the Council and the Commission shall 
ensure the consistency of activities undertaken in the context of enhanced 
cooperation and the consistency of such activities with the policies of the 
60  See also Weatherill (n 51) 21–40.
61  T Konstadinides, Division of Powers in the European Union (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2009) 256–57. 
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EU, and shall cooperate to that end. The Treaty of Lisbon has re-organised 
the previous set of rules on enhanced cooperation into two groups.62 First, 
the TEU lays down the general framework for enhanced cooperation and, 
secondly, the TFEU sets out the relevant criteria and details. In accordance 
with the pre-Lisbon legal framework, the current enhanced cooperation 
mechanisms still represent last resort solutions.63 In addition, Articles 326 
and 327 TFEU stress that enhanced cooperation may not undermine the 
internal market or constitute a barrier to trade or distort competition. It 
may thus be argued that the procedural hurdles of triggering enhanced 
cooperation are fairly complex when one looks at the limits set out in 
Article 326 TFEU.64 
It is only recently that the CJEU was called to rule on the legality of 
secondary legislation authorising the initiation of enhanced cooperation. 
Most recently, Spain and Italy contested a Council Decision authorising 
enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary patent protec-
tion.65 The Decision was adopted in 2011 with a view to creating a single 
European patent between 25 Member States out of 27, excluding Spain and 
Italy, which refused to take part.66 The two non-participant Member States 
brought an action for annulment against the Decision on several grounds. 
Two pleas are of particular importance. First, Spain and Italy argued that 
the EU lacked the legislative competence to adopt the Decision given 
that the European patent touched upon the establishment of competition 
rules for the functioning of the internal market under Article 3(1)(b)—an 
exclusive EU competence. The nature of the competence exercised by the 
Council was important because Article 20(1) TEU is explicit that enhanced 
cooperation can only be utilised in areas of non-exclusive EU competences. 
The CJEU disagreed and dismissed the actions brought by Spain and Italy 
against the Council’s Decision. It held that the competence exercised in this 
case was relevant to the functioning of the internal market which, accord-
ing to Article 4 TFEU, comprises a shared competence between the EU 
and the Member States. As such, the Council was competent to authorise 
enhanced cooperation vis-a-vis the EU patent system. Secondly, Spain and 
Italy argued, rather unsuccessfully, that in adopting the contested Decision, 
the Council did not pay lip service to Article 20(2) TEU, which provides 
that any exercise of enhanced cooperation must constitute a last resort and 
not a shortcut for speedy cooperation. There is a clear link between such a 
last-resort requirement when it comes to flexibility expressed in enhanced 
62  JC Piris, The Lisbon Treaty (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010).
63  In all areas except criminal law, which is discussed below.
64  Rosas and Armati (n 59) 108–10.
65  Joined Cases C-274/11 and C-295/11 Spain and Italy v Council (ECJ, 16 April 2013).
66  Council Decision 2011/167/EU authorising enhanced cooperation in the area of the 
creation of unitary patent protection [2011] OJ L76/53.
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cooperation and the way in which the subsidiarity principle generally oper-
ates in EU law. A common feature shared between flexibility and subsidiarity 
is that they both require other solutions to be tried out first before resort-
ing to them.67 As such, not only are they lightly applied in the course of 
EU law but they also share a light judicial review by the CJEU due to their 
political sensitivity.
In light of the above, we need to ask where the notion of consistency 
fits into the equation. Article 118 TFEU provides that a uniform European 
system of intellectual property rights shall be established. We have already 
discussed that one of the prominent manifestations of consistency is the 
uniformity of outcomes. In the same vein, the CJEU stressed in its judgment 
in Spain and Italy v Council: 
It is apparent from the first paragraph of Article 326 TFEU that the exercise, 
within the ambit of enhanced cooperation, of any competence conferred on the 
Union must comply with, among other provisions of the Treaties, that which 
confers that competence. The enhanced cooperation to which these actions relate 
must, therefore, be consistent with Article 118 TFEU.68
In the view of the CJEU, the correct interpretation of Article 118 TFEU 
does not, therefore, imply a uniform interpretation throughout the whole 
EU, but one that follows on from Article 20(4) TEU, which states that: 
‘Acts adopted in the framework of enhanced cooperation shall bind only 
participating Member States.’ Contrary to another plea raised by Spain and 
Italy, the CJEU made it plain that by creating a unitary patent applicable 
in the participating Member States only (while being open to all Member 
States) and not in the EU, the contested Decision did not damage the 
internal market or the economic, social and territorial cohesion of the EU 
contrary to Articles 118 and 326 TFEU and Article 20(1) TEU. From a 
consistency perspective, this is a very interesting approach when compared 
to the context of Article 114 TFEU case law, where the CJEU has been 
explicit that disparities between Member States form the main reason for 
the adoption of new harmonisation legislation.69 
Moving on to the limitations of the enhanced cooperation procedure, 
it should be recalled that the pre-Lisbon unanimity requirement in the 
Council for authorisation to proceed with enhanced cooperation severely 
limited its actual implementation. As such, enhanced cooperation remained 
67  Enhanced cooperation is traditionally considered to lie in the same pathway as EU sub-
sidiarity as it accepts that there is room for action outside the EU model. See also Weatherill 
(n 51) 21. 
68  Spain and Italy v Council (n 65) [66].
69  See, eg, Case C-210/03 Swedish Match [2004] ECR I-11893. The CJEU stressed that 
while mere disparities between national rules cannot justify recourse to art 114 TFEU, it is suf-
ficient where there are differences between the laws, regulations or administrative provisions 
of the Member States which could obstruct fundamental freedoms and thus have a direct effect 
on the functioning and establishment of the internal market.
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idle until recently.70 By contrast, the post-Lisbon use of qualified majority 
in the Council to activate enhanced cooperation has encouraged its use.71 
For instance, the first ever approval of resort to enhanced cooperation since 
1997 took place in July 2010 with reference to the law applicable to divorce 
and legal separation supported by 10 Member States.72 Shortly after this 
initiative, the enhanced cooperation procedure was used in the area of 
unitary patent protection.73 Overall, enhanced cooperation is an effective 
method in allowing certain Member States to move foreword by using the 
‘Community method’ without being held back by their less integrationist 
counterparts. At the same time, it is inclusive to non-participant Member 
States who may wish to take part in an initiative at a later date. Yet, despite 
treaty adjustments, as already pointed out in the context of recent CJEU 
jurisprudence, enhanced cooperation remains a last-resort mechanism and 
subordinate to the functioning of the internal market. This policy hierarchy 
is shaken when it comes to the use of enhanced cooperation in criminal law 
matters. In this area, enhanced cooperation is granted without a prerequi-
site of compliance with the principle of consistency or indeed the limitations 
set out by Article 20(1) TEU (ie, that Member States wishing to establish 
enhanced cooperation within the framework of the EU’s non-exclusive 
competences may apply the relevant provisions of the treaties, subject to the 
limits and in accordance with the detailed arrangements laid down in this 
provision and in Articles 326–34 TFEU).
70  Press Release ‘A First in EU History: Enhanced Cooperation to Help International 
Couples is in Force’, IP/10/1035. Available at: http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.
do?reference=IP/10/1035. See also Council Decision of 2010/405/EU of 12 July 2010 author-
ising enhanced cooperation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation 
[2010] OJ L189/12.
71  Member States who wish to establish enhanced cooperation between themselves in one 
of the areas covered by the treaties, but for fields of EU exclusive competence and the CFSP 
shall address a request to the Commission, specifying the scope and objectives of the enhanced 
cooperation in question. Authorisation to proceed with such enhanced cooperation shall be 
granted by the Council (acting by qualified majority), on a proposal from the Commission and 
after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.
72  Council Decision (n 70). See also S Peers, ‘Divorce, European Style: The First 
Authorisation of Enhanced Cooperation’ (2010) 6(3) European Constitutional Law Review 
339. It should perhaps be mentioned that a second authorisation of enhanced cooperation was 
adopted in March 2011 ([2011] OJ L76/53) and concerns a non-Justice and Home Affairs 
area (Unitary Patent Protection). On this, see S Peers, ‘Mission Accomplished? EU Justice and 
Home Affairs Law After the Treaty of Lisbon’ (2011) 48(3) CML Rev 661.
73  Council Decision 2011/167/EU of 10 March 2011 authorising enhanced cooperation in 
the area of the creation of unitary patent protection [2011] OJ L76/53. There is currently a case 
pending for the annulment of this decision: Case C-295/11 Italian Republic v Council of the 
European Union [2011] OJ C232/21. Italy argues, inter alia, that the enhanced cooperation pro-
cedure was authorised by the Council outside the limits provided for in the first subparagraph of 
art 20(1) TEU, according to which such a procedure is to be allowed only within the framework 
of the EU’s non-exclusive competences. Italy argues that the EU has an exclusive competence to 
create ‘European rules’ which have art 118 TFEU as their legal basis.
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Furthermore, the Treaty of Lisbon is silent about the place of consistency 
with regard to Title IV TEU, which envisages a form of enhanced coopera-
tion with reference to both the CFSP and the common security and defence 
policy (CSDP). Nevertheless, it can be deduced that Article 20(1) TEU tra-
nsmits consistency to enhanced cooperation taking place both under the 
TFEU and the TEU. Yet, the accepted exclusion of supra-national action 
in the field of European defence cooperation may be problematic for the 
advancement of enhanced cooperation in the area of the CSDP. Indeed, 
a European defence policy led by a pioneer group establishing enhanced 
cooperation would affect the consistency of the CSDP. Acts adopted under 
this provision would in time have to be acknowledged by those Member 
States which intend to participate in a given policy area. In that sense, con-
sistency as the inner logic of a policy advanced by enhanced cooperation 
may be jeopardised rather than facilitated. In the grand scheme of things, it 
may be argued that differentiation is detrimental to consistency in a holistic 
sense, ie, as a meta-principle underpinning the EU legal system. The political 
dimension of external affairs intervenes in practice whenever Member 
States see their self-interests as being worthy of protection regardless of the 
EU position.
It should perhaps be recalled that prior to the entry into force of the Treaty 
of Lisbon, the provisions for enhanced cooperation and strict legal criteria 
employed governing these provisions meant that no enhanced cooperation 
was ever adopted (set out in former Article 11 EC and Articles 40 and 43 
TEU). As such, the exact boundaries of the acquis communautaire remained 
unclear, but its clarification was important for ensuring that Member States 
would not establish enhanced cooperation in a way that would compromise 
the Community’s interests.74 In any case, these strict legal criteria meant 
that enhanced cooperation was never utilised prior to the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. The fear of legal fragmentation in this area, however, 
did not prejudice the rise of the phenomenon of a ‘two-speed’ Europe mani-
fested in the Treaty of Prüm75 and the Schengen acquis.76 These examples 
are indicative of the Member States’ wish to move further than their less 
integrationist counterparts in establishing the highest possible standard 
of cooperation. Such cooperation has taken place, for instance, by means 
of regular exchanges of information between Member States in order to 
counter terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration.77 
74  Weatherill (n 51).
75  Convention between Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands 
and Austria, signed in Prüm, Germany on 27 May 2005.
76  The Schengen Agreement of 1985. See generally S Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) ch 1.
77  See generally European Union Committee, Prüm: An Effective Weapon Against 
Terrorism and Crime? (HL 2006-07, 90-I). Available at: www.statewatch.org/news/2007/may/
eu-hol-prum-report.pdf.
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We will now look briefly into the application of the principle of consistency 
in two policy areas in which the Member States are likely to resort to 
enhanced cooperation, namely the CFSP and the AFSJ. Starting with the 
CFSP, we need to stress that the principle of loyalty set out in Article 4(3) 
TEU also applies in the field of EU external relations. Nonetheless, 
although such an all-encompassing obligation safeguards consistency, the 
CJEU is excluded from monitoring the CFSP (Article 275 TFEU). Instead, 
the monitoring of consistency compliance in EU external policy forms one 
of the tasks of the High Representative (Article 18 TEU), assisted by the 
European External Action Service (Article 27(3) TEU). Yet there is a double 
burden of consistency within the CFSP field, which calls for clarification. 
Apart from the High Representative, who is under an obligation to make 
sure that EU law pertaining external relations is consistent, the Council 
and the Commission shall ensure consistency in the context of enhanced 
cooperation as set out in Article 334 TFEU. More specifically, Article 20 
TEU borrows from Article 329(2) TFEU, which provides that the launching 
and authorisation of enhanced cooperation in the fields of the CFSP and 
the CSDP requires an institutional interplay between the Council, the High 
Representative and the Commission, as well as unanimity in the Council. 
The High Representative is then asked to give an opinion on whether the 
enhanced cooperation initiative is consistent with the EU’s foreign and 
security policy, while the Commission shall give its opinion on whether the 
proposal is consistent with other EU policies.
In the context of the AFSJ, the move to qualified majority voting is likely 
to affect the volume of legislation agreed under Articles 82 and 83 TFEU in 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters. As such, the so-called ‘emergency 
brake’ offers a degree of flexibility and appears to have been crucial in 
convincing Member States to surrender aspects of their national sovereignty 
in criminal matters over to the EU.78 More specifically, Articles 82(2)–(3) 
and 83(1)–(3) TFEU, which govern procedural and substantive criminal 
law, provide Member States with the possibility of freezing a proposal if 
they consider that an initiative is capable of affecting fundamental aspects 
of their criminal justice system. The matter is then referred to the European 
Council and the ordinary legislative procedure is suspended. Despite the 
significance of the emergency brake as a mechanism that compensates for 
the inherent risks of the removal of the national veto in EU criminal justice, 
one cannot overlook the potential fragmentation that its abuse may gener-
ate. Against the paralysis that may result from an unprecedented use of 
the emergency brake, the Treaty of Lisbon provides, under Article 83(3)(ii) 
TFEU, that if nine Member States wish to proceed with a far-reaching 
proposal, they may resort to enhanced cooperation. Still, however, the 
78  See, eg, Peers (n 76) ch 9.
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enhanced cooperation procedure has not yet been utilised in criminal 
law matters. Perhaps Member States find it challenging to balance a set 
of conflicting interests, such as the imperative of moving forward with 
respect towards the sensitive nature of criminal law.79 This is perhaps why 
criminal justice is the only area where the Treaty of Lisbon provides for 
automatic enhanced cooperation. Such practice, however, does not chime 
with the recurrent requirement of ensuring consistency across EU policies 
as stipulated in Article 13 TEU. Making enhanced cooperation automatic 
in the area of criminal law puts into sharp relief the value of the emergency 
brake as a safeguard to national sovereignty. 
B. Implied Consistency: Opt-Outs and the Court of Justice’s approach
The promotion of consistency is not express in the Treaty of Lisbon’s 
opt-out clauses. These clauses have traditionally been used as means of 
repatriating domestic powers from the EU by abstaining from joining 
the majority of Member States in a particular policy area. Member State-
specific opt-outs proliferated with the Treaty of Lisbon, and together with 
them, a transitional regime that undermines the consistency of EU law 
came into existence. For instance, one of the most striking features of dif-
ferentiation characterising the AFSJ is that the former EU Third Pillar is 
still in force.80 After all, Protocol 36 on Transitional Provisions provides 
for a five-year transition period (which ends in November 2014) before 
the (former) Third Pillar instruments become ‘Communitarised’ or, if we 
may, ‘Lisbon-ised’ and thus fall under the full jurisdiction of the CJEU. 
Therefore, despite the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon and, thereby, 
the merging of the former Pillars, there is still a strong presence of the old 
Third Pillar in terms of the transitional protocol and the five-year transition 
period that it stipulates. The result is that, during the transitional period, 
the Commission will not have the power to bring infringement procedures 
before the CJEU against Member States for breaches of existing AFSJ meas-
ures. Despite the absence of an express treaty commitment to consistency 
in this area of EU law, the legal uncertainty caused by the AFSJ transitional 
period necessitates an implied use of consistency while respecting the wishes 
of the Member States to delay the activation of the full panoply of criminal 
measures. 
79  See, eg, E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Enhanced Cooperation and Conflicting Values: Are New 
Forms of Governance the Same as Good Governance?’ in M Trybus and L Rubini (eds), After 
Lisbon: The Impact of the New Treaty on European Union (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
2012) ch 8.
80  Title V TFEU. See especially Arts 82–86 TFEU.
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Such a use of consistency will balance, for instance, the approach of the 
UK and Ireland with reference to their reception of the AFSJ legal frame-
work. Their approach represents one of the most drastic examples of what 
has been characterised as a ‘Europe of bits and pieces’.81 While the opt-out 
has historically provided that the UK and Ireland are not bound by any AFSJ 
measures unless they choose to participate (opt-in),82 Lisbon’s Protocol 21 
has extended such an opt-out to all areas including AFSJ measures in criminal 
law which previously fell outside the opt-out/opt-in scheme. The opt-out 
now applies to measures to which these Member States had previously 
opted-in. Protocol 21 also states that the UK and Ireland are not bound 
by the general right to data protection as provided by Article 16 TFEU. 
In addition to Protocol 21, the so-called ‘Schengen opt-out’ in Protocol 19 
confirms the British and Irish abstention from the Schengen acquis. 
Also, Protocol 19 and 22 (and Article 3 of Protocol 19) provides 
Denmark with a similar opt-out, although it is not as extensively ‘flexible’ 
as the British and Irish one.83 Denmark has opted for a static approach and 
expressed its unwillingness to take part in the AFSJ without the direct pos-
sibility to opt back in like the UK and Ireland. Indeed, Protocol 22, attached 
to the Treaty of Lisbon, grants Denmark a special position vis-a-vis the 
right to remain outside the AFSJ. Notwithstanding its abstention from 
the AFSJ, Denmark will still participate in Schengen-related measures and 
pre-Lisbon (former) Third Pillar instruments on the basis of international 
law which, as ever, continues to be binding and applicable to Denmark. 
Denmark may, however, notify the other Member States that it wishes 
to join the EU criminal law venture.84 Arguably, the Danish approach of 
saying no to the whole AFSJ project threatens the consistency of the practi-
cability of the AFSJ project, as the judicial system is largely based on mutual 
recognition in this area. Nevertheless, others have argued that the approach 
adopted by Denmark strengthens sovereignty without undermining unifor-
mity in the AFSJ. More specifically, Adler-Nissen argues that  differentiated 
integration is not a threat to the notion of ‘an ever closer Union’ but—as 
a matter of practice—an innovation quite consistent with the doxa of 
integration.85 Indeed, it could be argued that this is a confirmation of the 
81  Curtin (n 52).
82  See A Hinarejos, J Spencer and S Peers, ‘Opting Out of Criminal Law What is Actually 
Involved?’ (2012) Centre for European Law Cambridge Working Paper 1/2012. Available at: 
www.cels.law.cam.ac.uk/Media/working_papers/Optout%20text%20final.pdf.
83  See generally P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); 
Peers (n 76).
84  See E Herlin-Karnell, ‘Denmark and the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: 
A Scandinavian Arrangement’ (2011) 5(1) Amsterdam Law Forum 95. Available at: http://
ssrn.com/abstract=2246709.
85  R Adler-Nissen, ‘Opting Out of an Ever Closer Union: The Integration Doxa and the 
Management of Sovereignty’ (2011) 34(5) West European Politics 1092.
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CJEU’s approach, as demonstrated in Spain and Italy v Council,86 which 
is discussed above. But there is one important difference. Exporting the 
‘bits-and-pieces’ approach to the AFSJ also runs the risk of undermining 
fundamental rights protection and thereby lowering the standard in human 
rights protection in the EU where it is most needed.
In any case, and to continue the story of differentiation, Article 10(4) of 
Transitional Protocol 36 allows the UK to notify the Council that it does 
not accept the ‘Lisbon-isation’ of pre-existing criminal measures. Although 
the British government is planning to opt-out of 130 policing and criminal 
justice measures, it seems unlikely that it would choose to opt-out of former 
Third Pillar measures already in force—such as the Framework Decision 
on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW)87—unless they are amended.88 
Especially with regard to the EAW, it has been stressed that if the British 
government decides to opt-out of the AFSJ, it should opt back into the EAW 
at once in order to escape the possibility of any gap arising in its application.89 
Some uniformity will therefore be preserved due to the UK’s role as an eager 
proponent of EU anti-terrorism, data surveillance90 and anti-money launder-
ing legislation.91 These are key measures for public safety. Consistency in 
this context is therefore less of a central principle and more of a mask for 
pragmatic decision making. 
Although the Treaty of Lisbon has amplified the potential for differen-
tiation, it should be emphasised that the CJEU has been reactive towards 
unilateral initiatives by Member States to stretch the opt-out cherry-picking 
approach. For instance, the CJEU has been adverse towards Member States 
which, once they had secured an opt-out from a certain policy area, later 
demanded to be included in the adoption of legislation relevant to this 
area. For instance, under the Schengen rules, the UK may make a request 
to the Council for authorisation to participate in part or all of the Schengen 
provisions and, in addition, to contribute to the adoption of measures based 
on the Schengen acquis (Articles 4 and 5 of the Schengen Protocol). The 
86  Spain and Italy v Council (n 65).
87  Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States [2002] OJ L190/1.
88  Ibid. For a detailed account of the transitional rules, see Peers (n 76) 82–83.
89  A Travis, ‘EU Policing and Justice Opt-Out Would Endanger Internal Security, Lords 
Warn’ The Guardian (London, 23 April 2013).
90  See Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 
2006 on the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of 
publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks 
and amending Directive 2002/58/EC [2006] OJ L105/54. See also T Konstadinides, ‘Destroying 
Democracy on the Ground of Defending it? The Data Retention Directive, the Surveillance 
State and Our Constitutional Ecosystem’ (2011) 36(5) European Law Review 722–36.
91  Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 October 
2005 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purpose of money laundering 
and terrorist financing (Third Money Laundering Directive) [2005] OJ L309/15. 
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Council will have to decide on such a request by unanimity unless the leg-
islative proposal in question is built on the pre-existing Schengen acquis, to 
which the UK has secured an opt-out. Such was the case in UK v Council,92 
where the UK sought the annulment of Regulation 2007/2004 adopted 
in 2004 with a view to establishing an external border control agency.93 
The UK was not included in the adoption of the challenged Regulation 
that was building on the provisions of the pre-existing Schengen acquis. In 
yet another case, the UK sought, again, the annulment of a regulation on 
the standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel 
documents issued by Member States. As in the previous case, the UK was 
excluded from participating in the regulation’s adoption.94 In both cases, 
the CJEU upheld the Council’s discretion to refuse to allow the UK to 
take part in the adoption of these regulations.95 These judgments can be 
characterised as consistency-driven. The implied use of consistency by the 
CJEU served to compensate for the lack of textual reference to consistency 
in the Treaty of Lisbon vis-a-vis the execution of opt-outs. The Schengen 
example demonstrates that the CJEU can effectively police the Member 
States’ level of participation in a given policy area by ‘gate-keeping’ their 
preferences which amount to non-unitary integration.96 Such a ‘strategic’ 
consistency approach by the CJEU in the opt-out ‘hard cases’ is a welcome 
development.
V. CONCLUSION
This chapter has sought to provide an account of the rise of and many 
expressions of the principle of consistency in EU law and thereby to shed 
some light upon its legal, strategic and theoretical implications. In doing so, 
we discussed consistency as being of fundamental importance both within 
the treaty structure as a mechanism for ensuring institutional balance and 
in the CJEU’s reasoning. This is important with regard to the EU’s internal 
92  Case C-77/05 UK v Council ECR I-11459; Case C-137/05 UK v Council [2007] ECR 
I-11593.
93  Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 of 26 October 2004 establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the 
Member States of the European Union [2004] OJ L349/1. See also E Fahey, ‘Jagged-Edged 
Jigsaw: The Limits of Multi-speed Integration and Policy Choices of Ireland and the UK’ in 
Trybus and Rubini (n 79).
94  Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 of 13 December 2004 on standards for security 
features and biometrics in passports and travel documents issued by Member States [2004] 
OJ L385/1. 
95  Above n 92.
96  See also M O’Neil, ‘EU Cross-border Policing Provisions, the View from One of the 
Schengen Opt Out States’ (2009) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal 
Justice. Available at: http://uaces.org/documents/papers/0901/o_neill.pdf.
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and external policies,97 as well as horizontally between EU institutions 
and, vertically between the EU and the Member States. With regard to the 
vertical relationship between the EU and the Member States, we looked at 
the Treaty of Lisbon’s thin formal consistency and the CJEU’s notions of 
‘strategic’ consistency. We examined how the core principle of loyalty that 
governs the relationship between the EU and the Member States has been 
stretched by the CJEU to ensure consistency in the application of EU law. 
Whilst the CJEU’s notion of ‘strategic’ consistency seems welcome in 
‘hard cases’, there are cases where it appears that there is little consistent 
strategy behind the CJEU’s teleology. For instance, it is unclear whether the 
CJEU’s notion of consistency as an ‘best endeavours obligation’ has been 
built gradually on a case-by-case basis or whether instead it constitutes part 
of a more concrete strategy to build a coercive constitutional dictum which 
binds Member States in all cases. As such, it can be argued that within the 
classic model of uniform integration, consistency’s flimsy textual meaning 
and its interpretation by the CJEU have destabilised it as a principle. It is 
therefore suggested that the political institutions of the EU provide some 
guidelines regarding the meaning of the principle and its implications for 
the division of powers in EU law.
As to the question of whether consistency has a role to play in differentiated 
integration, we discussed the extent to which certain schemes of differentiated 
integration are characterised by an overlying consistent approach. Our 
response stresses that consistency is indeed crucial in this area in whichever 
form it manifests itself—expressly or implicitly. Yet, consistency is hard to 
apply and measure within differentiated integration. The Treaty of Lisbon 
provides for several forms of flexibility and differentiation. We looked 
into the added value of consistency within variables of differentiation in 
which consistency is either highlighted by the Treaty of Lisbon or remains 
neglected. The discussion of asymmetric constitutional arrangements, such 
as the enhanced cooperation procedure and the AFSJ opt-outs, illustrates 
that consistency is not only relevant where it enjoys an express or textual 
reference in the Treaty, but it may also comprise an implied concern in all 
EU policy areas because it may help EU institutions (the CJEU in particular) 
countering fragmentation. Yet, on the downside, the concept of flexibility 
can be too political for the CJEU to conceptualise—thus, there is a poten-
tial problem of justiciability.98 It is therefore imperative that the CJEU 
handles sensitive cases with care, since the very notions of flexibility and 
97  R Wessel, ‘The Inside Looking Out: Consistency and Delimitation in EU External 
Relations’ (2000) 37 CML Rev 1135; P Van Elsuwege, ‘EU External Action After the Collapse 
of the Pillar Structure: In Search of a New Balance Between Delimitation and Consistency’ 
(2010) 47 CML Rev 987.
98  F Amtenbrink and D Kochenov, ‘Towards a More Flexible Approach to Enhanced 
Cooperation’ in A Ott and E Vos (eds), 50 Years of European Integration: Foundations and 
Perspectives (The Hague, TMC Asser Press, 2009). 
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consistency are too slippery as legal concepts and easily transgress compe-
tence borders.
As discussed in this chapter, consistency has provided the CJEU with 
justification for a number of incremental judgments based on the rationale 
that the consistent application of codified and non-codified legal duties 
and principles not only guarantees the integrity of the EU legal system but 
also boosts its uniformity and effectiveness. Yet, as explained above, due 
to the post-Lisbon transitional measures, the CJEU stands at an awkward 
juncture by not being able to adjudicate upon a host of areas previously 
tucked away to the former intergovernmental Pillars. For instance, the 
manifold opt-outs and opt-ins negotiated with reference to the AFSJ will 
affect the ability of the CJEU to achieve a workable dynamic. Nevertheless, 
the CJEU seems at times to have entertained the possibility of a multi-speed 
Europe.99 To use an example, it recently held that for the sake of the future 
development of the Schengen acquis, Member States are not obliged, when 
they develop closer cooperation between themselves, to provide for special 
adaptation measures for other Member States which have not yet taken 
part in the adoption of measures relating to earlier stages of the evolution 
of the acquis. 
In the absence of a single agreed-upon definition, consistency still remains 
as much an aspiration principle—a truism that different statements of law 
need to be in tune—as a pointer to a number of EU legal obligations. It could 
also be added that, however significant in preserving good governance, 
the idea of consistency within EU law constitutes a symbolic concept—a 
quality closely connected to the wider integrationist task of making the 
EU more relevant and comprehensive to its citizens.100 However, even if 
we accept consistency’s symbolic character, it appears that the citizen plays 
no particular role in the search for consistency. As such, the consistency 
question turns on the more complex questions of institutional balance and 
competence delimitation between the EU and the Member States that the 
CJEU has often resolved in favour of the former. But the quest is not yet 
complete. Article 7 TFEU presents us with the destination (ie, that the EU 
‘shall ensure consistency between its policies and activities’), but provides 
no particular instructions as to how to reach it.
Whilst hardly anyone would disagree that the EU should be a consistent 
project, reconciling the principle of consistency with the principle of con-
ferral of powers remains difficult. In this contribution, we have tried to 
capture the essence of consistency and have argued that consistency should 
be perceived as a benchmark which seeks to strike the right balance of EU 
  99  Case C-482/08 UK and Ireland v Council (ECJ, 26 October 2010). See also Faber (n 56); 
J Shaw, ‘Flexibility in a “Reorganised” and Simplified Treaty’ (2003) 40(2) CML Rev 279.
100  See also C Harlow, ‘A Common European Law of Remedies?’ in C Kilpatrick et al (eds), 
The Future of Remedies in Europe (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000) 69. 
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action. It operates as a balancing mechanism. This begs the following question: 
should consistency always be taken to mean more EU law involvement 
merely because the very concept of uniformity is an inherent characteristic 
of the process of integration? Such a view would seem to suggest that con-
sistency forms part of the more general ambition of ensuring the effet utile 
of EU law. If that is the case, then why do we need the separate notion of 
consistency written all across the Treaty of Lisbon? While a value-based 
‘strategic’ consistency approach by the CJEU is desirable to resolve ‘hard 
cases’, the over-application of or preference for teleological ‘strategic’ 
consistency would ultimately distort the division of powers in EU law and 
would threaten harmony—generating a crack in the boundary line that 
divides the two main plates of the EU’s crust.

